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ATTITUDES TOWARDS LIMITED ENTRY AMONG
FINFISHERMEN IN NORTHERN NEW ENGLAND
James M. Acheson
ABSTRACT
Management of marine fisheries by "limited entry legislation" promises not only to protect the breeding stock and increase
catches,but also to improve economic efficiency and increase returns to fishermen. It will also undoubtedly disrupt existing
social and economic relationships. While no limited entry legislation is in effect in New England, fishermen know about the
limited entry management option and have strong opinions that are certain to influence politicial support. Some of the 190
Maine and New Hampshire fishermen interviewed favor or oppose such legislation because their own "economic self-
interest" would be positively or negatively affected. Most, however, oppose or favor such legislation on "ideational
grounds"--e.g., they favor "free enterprise." Quantitative data on attitudes towards limited entry and such factors as age of
fisherman, primary species exploited, and versatility of fishing operation suggest that attitudes were more influenced by
"self-interest" than many admitted overtly.
THE PROMISE OF LIMITED ENTRY
The past fifty years have seen a rapid decline in many of the
world's most productive fisheries. For example, in the United
States the Georges Bank haddock catch, once the mainstay of
the New England fishery, declined from 120 million pounds in
1965 to a mere 11.7 million pounds in 1972 (Alexander
1972). Similar declines have been seen in the past few years in
bluefin tuna, northern shrimp, the southern shrimp (penaeus
species), Pacific sardine, northern lobster, dungeness crab,
cod, Pacific halibut, surf clams, and many other species. Al-
though natural environmental factors (e.g., water tempera-
ture) and industrial side effects (e.g., dams, pollution) have
played a role in the decline of some species, the major prob-
lem in most cases is overfishing (Gulland 1974).
Fisheries economists have pointed out that overexploitation
is not an unusual phenomenon, but is to be expected, given
the fact that oceans are common property resources. Since
oceans are owned by no one and can be exploited by anyone,
no one has any interest in maintaining the resources. Why
should one man cut his fishing effort to conserve? The fish he
does not catch today will be caught by someone else tomor-
row. Under these conditions, a fisherman is only being rational
when he expands the amount of capital equipment he owns,
and tries to catch all the fish he can as quickly as possible
(Acheson 1975b; Wilson 1975).
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The result is what Hardin (1968) calls the "tragedy of the
commons." Common property resources of all kinds-
publicly owned land, air, rivers, oceans-are subject to
abuses and overexploitation that do not occur with privately
owned resources. It is not only that common property re-
sources are overexploited by a callous public; they are sub-
jected to a kind of escalating abuse because those exploiting
such resources are locked into a system in which it is only
logical that they increase their exploitation without limit. As far
as fisheries are concerned, the "tragedy" takes the form of
overexploitation, depletion of fish stocks, inefficiency under-
utilization of capital, escalating costs of fish for the consumer,
and where opportunity costs are high, the acceptance of low
incomes (Hardin 1968: 1245-1246).
Usually attempts to regulate fisheries take the form of ma-
nipulating fishing seasons, fishing areas, and the type of fishing
gear used. While such regulations may limit fishing mortality,
economists have pointed out that they are probably relatively
ineffective and certainly make fishing more inefficient (Pon-
tecorvo and Vartdal 1967; Crutchfield and Pontecorvo 1969;
De Wolf 1974). This, in turn, lowers returns to the fishermen
and raises prices for the consumer.
Several economists have argued that a far better manage-
ment system would involve limiting entry into the fishery either
by a licensing system (Pontecorvo 1967; Christy 1973) or by
taxation (Pontecorvo and Vartdal 1967). The advantage of
such limited entry systems is that they promise to substantially
reduce fishing effort while promoting economic systems. In
general, many fisheries managers favor the introduction of
limited entry systems. They expect that such schemes will be-
come the cornerstone of management policy under the
Fisheries Conservation and Management Act of 1976, which
extends Federal jurisdiction over fisheries out to 200 miles.
Certainly such management systems appear very promis-
ing. If limited entry systems were adopted, fishing mortality
would be decreased as fishing effort declines, and the catch or
harvest of fish would increase as well. This can be seen in
Figure 1, which demonstrates that any legislation reducing the
existing level of fishing effort would have the effect of increas-
ing fish catches-at least until maximum sustainable yield is
reached. Moreover, efficiency of the boats remaining in the
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Figure 1. Relationship between fishing effort and catches.
fishery would be increased, since each boat would presumably
be able to catch more fish per unit of effort. This would result
in larger returns to owners of boats and higher wages to
fishermen. The larger supplies of fish and the increase in effi-
ciency should result in more fish being made available to the
consumer at lower prices. Finally, the redundant capital and
labor removed from the industry (that is, boats and fishermen
no longer allowed to fish) would presumably be transferred to
some other industry where they could be used more produc-
tively, and where returns would be higher. In short, limited
entry promises to aid the fish, the fishermen, and the con-
sumer alike.
Fishermen are clearly not convinced that limited entry holds
forth the promise of the best of all possible worlds. When such
systems are proposed, they feel very ambivalent about such
plans or actively oppose them. Only a few limited entry laws
have been passed-most notably in the salmon fisheries of
British Columbia and Alaska-and they have received strong
opposition. For example in 1974-75, there was a very seri-
ous attempt on the part of fishermen from Kodiak, Alaska, to
overturn the Alaska law. In 1975, a bill to limit fishermen in the
Maine lobster industry was soundly defeated in the state legis-
lature because of opposition by certain industry groups.
Given the promise of limited entry legislation, and the fact
that the Fisheries Conservation and Management Act of 1976
is written in ways that will certainly stimulate a series of limited
entry proposals, it seems important to understand the factors
influencing the political acceptability of such proposals-
especially the reasons fishermen oppose or advocate these
management schemes. Fishermen are the interested players,
and in the past they have demonstrated a marked capacity to
effectively block attempts to manage fisheries, regardless of
how badly regulation might be needed.
The reasons fishermen oppose limited entry legislation are
not completely clear. However, several social scientists have
noted that the major proponents of limited entry legislation are
economists, who have focused on the economic and biologi-
cal benefits and have overlooked the fact that such legislation
will also cause disruption to existing social and economic sys-
tems (Andersen and Stiles 1973: 61-64; Stiles 1976:248 ff).
These social scientists have hypothesized that opposition to
limited entry stems from real or perceived deleterious social
and economic effects of such legislation (Smith 1974). Our
current study substantiates this hypothesis. However, our
study demonstrates that the factors influencing the political
support for limited entry legislation are complicated indeed. In
the Maine groundfishery, fishermen both opposed and advo-
cated limited entry legislation for a variety of reasons. More
important, our data suggest that there is a substantial dif-
ference between the stated reasons concerning limited entry
legislation and the underlying reasons influencing support or
opposition.
RESPONSES OF FISHERMEN
CONCERNING LIMITED ENTRY
PROPOSALS
During 1977 and 1978 a team of social scientists from the
University of Maine gathered a large amount of information
from 190 captains of boats that fished primarily for finfish
(mainly groundfish vessels, but some herring ones as well).
The 190 interviews represent at least 65 percent of all finfish-
ing boats in Maine and New Hampshire during 1977 - 78. In
addition to data on the captain, his boat, and fishing opera-
tions, a great deal of information was obtained on attitudes
towards various possible ways to manage the fisheries of the
region, Special emphasis was placed on gathering data on
reactions toward limited entry.
The information on limited entry was obtained by open-
ended interviews. We simply asked the fisherman involved if
he "would approve or disapprove of limited entry legislation"
for his section of the industry. Then we asked for an explana-
tion. Fishermen knew a good deal about limited entry, had a
good many ideas on the subject, and were not hesitant to
communicate them. In great part, their interest and knowledge
can be traced to the fact that a limited entry bill for the lobster
industry-the largest fishery in Maine-had recently been
proposed and defeated. There were also several articles on
limited entry in the Maine Commercial Fishermen and other
trade papers.
After the data were collected by the interview team, the
results were run on the University of Maine IBM 370 com-
puter.
In this paper, two different types of data resulting from this
study will be presented: (1) the verbal statements of fishermen
concerning the reasons they do or do not favor limited entry
legislation-as we shall see, many of these responses are
highly ideational and show a strong concern with broad philo-
sophical positions with regard to governmental regulations
and related issues-and (2) a set of quantitative data, linking
attitudes towards limited entry to other social, technical, and
economic factors. These latter data strongly suggest that
fishermen are far more concerned with short run economic
costs and benefits than some would care to admit.
Very few fishermen were neutral or ambivalent towards lim-
ited entry. The 190 fishermen questioned gave some 55 dif-
ferent answers on the topic. However, these responses dearly
fell into six different classes, showing six different kinds of
concerns. Two classes of responses showed a decided positive
stance toward limited entry; four were negative. These classes
of responses are summarized in Table 1.
Several people interviewed gave more than one of these
answer types. Most fishermen, however, gave one answer or
were clearly primarily interested in only one issue. Thus, we
recorded in Table 1 only the primary response given by each
respondent. A complete breakdown of secondary or tertiary
answers is not presented since it added little to our understand-
ing. Several comments need to be made on each of these
responses.
Negative Response #1. Men who gave this response were
not against regulation per se. They wanted specific kinds of
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Table 1. Summary of responses of fishermen towards limited entry legislation.
Type of Response Response of Fishermen Number Responding
Negative Response #1 Limited Entry is not needed; other types of regulation should be 7
passed and are far more important.
Negative Response #2 Natural economic or biological cycles will solve the problem. 15
Negative Response #3 I am against limited entry since it may prevent me or close kinsmen 12
from fishing.
Negative Response #4 The "Adam Smith" response: I am against limited entry because 61
this is supposed to be a free country; there are too many regula-
tions now. Free enterprise will handle the problems of the fisheries
better than the government.
Positive Response #1 I am for limited entry since there are too many boats, traps, nets, 28
and fishermen now. Something has to be done to ensure that some
fish will survive to breed.
Positive Response #2 1 am for limited entry since it will reduce excess competition and 28
benefit me personally
Ambivalent 4
Missing Data 38
Total 148
regulations that they thought would benefit their section of the
industry more than limited entry would. Several different types
of regulations were mentioned. One draggerman wanted
larger mesh regulations; two herring stop-seiners favored laws
prohibiting purse seiners from operating close to shore;
another draggerman favored laws limiting the size of boats;
two other dragger fishermen favored a ban on gillnetting on
the grounds that "lost gill nets kill a lot of fish."
Negative Response #2. Men who gave this response are
really making two different kinds of arguments. First, they are
suggesting that levels of stocks and populations are strongly
cyclical, and that predation by man is not one of the primary
factors responsible for the great fluctuations in fish stocks ob-
served. In the words of one fisherman: "Why have a limited
entry system to save the fish? The amount of fish is going to go
up and down as it always has. The number of boats in the
fishery has nothing to do with fish stocks. Other things like
water temperature and food supplies are far more important."
Some biologists would agree, at least in part (Dean 1979).
Most population dynamicists would not, arguing that recruit-
ment into the fishery (i.e. numbers of marketable fish) is de-
pendent on the number of eggs in the water, which in turn is a
function of number of breeding-sized fish.
The second argument these men are making is that overfish-
ing will be reduced by economic pressure. That is, as fish
stocks fall, some people will be forced out of business, which
of course, will automatically reduce fishing pressure. In time,
as natural conditions change, these men argue, the fish stocks
will increase again.
Negative Response #3. Very few men who gave this re-
sponse said openly that they personally feared being removed
immediately from the industry. They were all aware that those
proposing limited entry provisions have always made provi-
sions to "grandfather in" all those men currently fishing. A few
openly said that they thought limited entry would result in
more competition, which might force them from the business
at some time in the future.
Most of the men who gave this response were concerned
with closing out "my sons" or other "young people." This
concern reflects the fact that effective lineage ties in Maine
communities are very strong, and a great deal of the meaning
of life is tied up with living in a particular place with a wide set
of kinsmen (Acheson and Lazarowitz 1980; Lazarowitz and
Acheson 1980). Many men enter fishing not because they are
committed to the industry per se, but because it is the only
occupation they can enter that allows them to live near home.
There is, of course, no sense living at home, if the people you
want to be near are forced to live in Pittsburgh, Muncie, or San
Jose.
It should be understood clearly that very few of these men
assumed that their sons or kinsmen would be prohibited out-
right from entering fishing. Rather, they were concerned that
the rules governing entry into the fishery under a limited entry
scheme would somehow favor wealthy people or large corpo-
rations. Five or six of these respondents said (in almost the
same words): "No one is going to say that a poor boy can't go
fishing, but you know it will be the big companies that will get
the licenses or permits." While only 12 men mentioned this as
a primary reason for opposing limited entry a much larger
number of men mentioned "relatives" or "inheritance of the
business' in passing. It was something they clearly did not
quite know how to talk about. Men in the United States do
have trouble talking about how much their family means to
them. However, we received the distinct impression that a
limited entry bill that was framed in such a way that it would
interfere with traditional transmission of family fishing busi-
nesses would be opposed severely by a -far larger number of
men than our sample alone would indicate.
Negative Response #4. The most common response was
what we came to call the "Adam Smith response." That is,
people said they opposed limited entry because it would mean
government intervention and an end of free enterprise. Free
enterprise, in their view, was obviously a good thing; and
government intervention was both bad and ineffective as a
solution to the problems facing fisheries.
Frankly, we never imagined that large numbers of people
would give this response when asked about limited entry. At
first, we were very suspicious, and tended to probe deeply to
get at the other real reasons for opposition to limited entry. A
surprising number, when questioned, went into long spiels
about the "government," liberally laced with much invective.
It was very clear that most of these people really had a strong
Fisheries, Vol. 5, No. 622
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distaste for additional regulation, and did not believe that the
government could solve the problems of fisheries (or very
much else, for that matter). In this respect, these fishermen are
joining the millions of Americans who have made California's
tax-cutting Proposition 13 a potent political reality all across
the nation.
Our probing, however, revealed two other deeper con-
cerns. First, some 20 men who were concerned about "the
government" were automatically assuming that the rules and
regulations a government would pass would benefit large cor-
porations or other wealthy interests. In this respect their re-
sponses were not much different from those who gave nega-
tive responses #3.
The other concern was one that many people could hardly
articulate clearly. Many kept talking about welfare, and about
being protected by "big brother" government. They clearly
did not like either. In the phraseology of two men, "Limited
entry doesn't protect the fish; it protects fishermen."
Most of these stock phrases about government, we are con-
vinced, reflect certain basic values and presuppositions-the
most difficult subjects for the people of a culture to articulate.
These answers reflect the fact that people in the fishing indus-
try place great value on doing something useful, on earning
their own way, and take pride in contributing to the food
supply of the nation. Limited entry, in the view of many,
threatened these basic values and their own sense of worth.
Positive Response #1. Twenty-eight men favored limited
entry because this legislation was necessary, in their view, to
preserve fish stocks. None of them was happy at the thought
of more government regulation, but they thought that some
control on fishing effort was needed and that limited entry
both would be effective and would cause the fewest problems.
As one person phrased it, "There are just too many boats,
men, and traps. More are coming all the time, and the gear is
getting more efficient. If we are going to have any fish left to
catch, some of these fishermen are going to have to earn their
living in some other line of work. That's the truth." The mood
of these respondents was somber. They clearly had misgivings
about the viability of their industry and about limited entry.
Positive Response #2. Some 25 people in the sample ap-
proved of limited entry legislation because they were sure it
would help them personally in both the short and long run.
Most of them assumed that since they were established in the
business, they would be granted a license to continue fishing.
They saw the benefits primarily in terms of decreased competi-
tion as potential new entrants were excluded from the fishery.
Eight of them said they expected limited entry would bring
gradual increase in fish stocks and catches. However, concern
for the welfare of the fish stocks was a secondary importance.
STRUCTURAL POSITION AND
ATTITUDES TOWARD LIMITED ENTRY
When asked about limited entry, a very high percentage of
the respondents mentioned ideational issues (i.e., negative re-
sponse #4), and stressed their faith in free enterprise as a
solution to the problems of overexploitation and their lack of
faith in government regulation. Only those giving positive re-
sponse #2 and negative response #3 mentioned their own
economic self-interest. There is, however, a good deal of
quantitative evidence that many, if not most, of the fishermen
questioned are very concerned about the effect of limited
entry legislation on their own economic position. This appears
to be the case whether or not they admitted it openly.
There are significant correlations between attitudes toward
limited entry and age, major species sought, and the versatility
of a man's fishing operations, which indicate a great deal
about social, economic, and technical factors underlying at-
titudes concerning management.
Table 2. Attitudes toward limited entry by age of fisherman.
Under 39 40 or over Total
For limited entrya 28 15 43
Opposed to limited
entryb 33 42 75
Total 61 57 118
Chi square = 4.007
Degrees of freedom = 1
Level of significance = >0.05
aThose listed as "for limited entry" gave either positive response
number 1 or number 2.
bThose listed as "opposed" gave one of the four negative responses
listed in Table 1.
AGE AND LIMITED ENTRY
There is a very strong relationship between the age of the
fisherman and his attitudes toward' limited entry legislation
(Table 2).
In Table 2, we see that a fair proportion of men under the
age of 39 are "for" limited entry legislation, while a high pro-
portion of men over the age of 40 oppose it. The reason for
these responses is related to differential incentives. Young
men stand to gain by such legislation; a high proportion of the
older men do not. Since limited entry legislation will produce
higher fish yields in an estimated five to thirty years, passage of
such legislation will mean that older men will pick up the costs
in terms of decreased catches, and so on now, and long after
they are dead or retired the benefits will acrue to others. A
good many fishermen are well aware of this situation, and will
talk about it when pressed. One 74-year-old New Harbor
fisherman expressed it as follows: "I ain't going for nothin' of
the likes (i.e., limited entry). Maybe it will bring in the fish by
the year 2000 but I'll be long gone by then. I'm thinkin' of
what I can catch from one year to the other."
These men, and others their age, were dearly assigning a
high discount rate to future catches. It is obviously not in the
best interest of such people to conserve fish now so that
someone else can get higher yields in the future.
LIMITED ENTRY AND PRIMARY TARGET
SPECIES
As can be seen in Table 3, fishermen in different kinds of
fishing enterprises have very different attitudes towards limited
entry. The results are significant at the 0.01 level, so that it is
very unlikely that these results could have occurred by chance
alone.
In general, the men whose primary species was lobster
strongly favored "limited entry" legislation. Another study in-
volving a much larger sample of lobster fishermen showed
exactly the same thing (Acheson 1975a). There are two rea-
sons. First, lobster fishing has become less profitable in recent
years. Total catches have remained about the same for the
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Table 3. Attitudes towards limited entry by primary species sought.,
Scallops Lobster Herring Groundfish Total
For limited entryb 0 12 0 30 42
Opposed to limited
entry 5 7 10 51 73
Total 115
Chi square = 6.9
Degrees of freedom = 3
Level of significance = 0.01
aOur sample of 190 fishermen all fished for groundfish over some part of the annual cycle. Some had another species as their major target species,
however.
bThose listed as "for limited entry" gave either positive response number 1 or 2, as indicated in Table 1,
'Those listed as opposed gave negative responses 1 to 4.
past 10 years, while the amount of effort has increased enor-
mously (Morrissey 1968; Table 20).
In addition, lobster fishermen have always limited their
numbers by informal means. In order to go lobster fishing at
all, one must not only have a license, but also gain entry into a
"harbor gang." Once a person is admitted to such a "gang" or
clique, he is permitted to go fishing only in the territory
"owned" by that "gang" (Acheson 1972, 1975a, 1975b,
1979). Part-time fishermen, or others who are not members of
the harbor gang, are usually heavily sanctioned by surrepti-
tious destruction of their fishing gear. In short, lobstermen favor
limited entry more than any other group primarily because
they are fully aware that there are too many lobster fishermen,
and because such legislation is congruent with existing norms
prevailing in the industry.
A moderate proportion (37 percent) of the men who had
groundfish as primary species also favored "limited entry."
Most of these men noted openly that groundfishing was be-
coming crowded as larger numbers of lobster fishermen and
others moved into this fishery. Many of them favored limited
entry since it promised to reserve this fishery for those already
Table 4. Versatility of fishing operation and attitudes toward limited
entry.
Dependence on Versatile fishing
single species operationc Total
Opposed to limited
entry" 24 50 74
Favor limited entryb 5 38 43
Total 117
Chi square = 5.24
Degrees of freedom = 1
Level of significance = 0.02
aMen were classified as "opposed" to limited entry if they gave one of
the four negative comments listed in Table 1.
bThey were classified as "favoring" limited entry if they gave either
positive response 1 or 2.
OMen were classified as having versatile fishing operations if they did
one or more of the following (1) make a major change in species sought
over the year, (2) make a major change in fishing gear once in the
annual cycle, (3) expect to buy a boat at least eight feet larger than their
present boat in the near future, (4) expect to enter a more versatile type
of fishing in the near future, (5) anticipate a major change in species mix
exploited in the near future, (6) anticipate a major change in vessel or
gear in the near future.
established in it. However, some 62.9 percent of those who
had groundfish as their primary species did not favor limited
entry. Most of these objected to this kind of legislation on
ideational grounds (negative response #4), and gave long lec-
tures on the values of free enterprise, and so on.
All of the men who had herring and scallops as major
species "opposed" limited entry legislation. While the num-
bers involved are too small for statistical reliability, it should be
noted that several of these men admitted openly that they had
been "doing very well" in the past two or three years. They
did not want any legislation passed (i.e. limited entry) that
would change or modify a very profitable fishery. Most of
these scallopers and herring fishermen said they opposed lim-
ited entry for ideational reasons (negative response #4).
However, their own economic self-interest was only barely
under the surface.
VERSATILITY OF FISHING OPERATIONS
AND ATTITUDES TOWARDS LIMITED
ENTRY
A few fishermen in recent public hearings concerning
fisheries management legislation have openly opposed limited
entry on the grounds that they were involved in several dif-
ferent fisheries over the annual cycle and were afraid that
limited entry legislation would prevent them from exploiting
the variety of species needed to make a living fishing. For
example, one fisherman phrased the issue in this way: "To
keep the wolf away from the door we have to switch from
scallops to finfish to lobsters" (Maine Commercial Fisheries
1979:1). A good many other fishermen stated during the
course of being interviewed that they were planning to buy
more versatile boats and fishing gear, since they were afraid of
being "closed out" of the fishery they were in by Federal
legislation (Acheson 1980).
With these kinds of comments in mind, we originally
hypothesized that men who depended on one species would
favor limited entry, since this would reserve this species for
them exclusively. Correspondingly, those who exploited mul-
tiple species over the year, or who planned to have versatile
operations, would oppose such legislation, because limited
entry would likely restrict the range of species open to them.
The data demonstrate that there is a strong connection be-
tween versatility of fishing operations and attitudes towards
limited entry. They also show that our original hypotheses
were absolutely wrong (see Table 4).
Fisheries, Vol. 5, No. 624
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 M
ain
e] 
at 
16
:22
 19
 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
1 
From these figures it is apparent that a very high proportion
(82 percent) of those who are dependent on single species
are opposed to limited entry legislation, while a moderate per-
centage (43 percent) of those with versatile fishing operations
favored such legislation. The Chi Square figures are significant
at the 0.02 level, so that these results are very unlikely to have
happened by chance.
A check through our original interview forms and sub-
sequent calls to some of the fishermen interviewed strongly
suggest that men dependent on a single species oppose lim-
ited entry because they are afraid such legislation would close
them out of the fishery on which they are completely depen-
dent. They are aware that such legislation might benefit "the
fish in the long run" as one man phrased it, but they are
concerned with making a living in the short run.
Over 50 percent of those with "versatile" fishing operations
also oppose limited entry-mainly on ideational grounds.
More of them favor it, however, than do the "single species"
fishermen. Our information suggests that these respondents
believe it will benefit either them personally or the fish stocks.
In addition, they are not so fearful of limited entry as those
with less versatile operations. After all, they have the capability
of fishing for several species, so that limited entry would
merely mean a change to another species-probably a
species the fisherman is currently exploiting. We suspect that a
lot of the men listed as "versatile fishermen" agree with one
Portsmouth, N.H., respondent when he said: "The secret of
success in this business is to be able to do everything: gillnet,
drag, purse seine, scallop. The government may have to close
off some fisheries some of the time; but they can't close them
all off. People gotta eat, you know."
SUMMARY
The results of this study indicate that Maine and New
Hampshire fishermen feel very ambivalent about limited en-
try. On the whole, support for such legislation would be
greatest among lobstermen and groundfishermen; less among
scallopers and herring fishermen. Younger men who fish or
plan to fish for multiple species would support such legislation
more than older men who are dependent on single species
fisheries. Support will undoubtedly be linked to the ways in
which specific legislation is framed. It will be greatest if limited
entry bills minimize the day-to-day influence of governing
agencies in fisheries, do not interfere with transmission of
businesses from senior kinsmen to junior kinsmen, and give
no special favors to large corporations that threaten a "corpo-
rate takeover" of the fisheries.
This is not to suggest that fishermen are solely concerned
with short-run benefits and costs. There were two aspects of
fishermen's attitudes towards limited entry that deserve signifi-
cant mention in this regard.
First, there were a large number of men interested in long-
run effects of limited entry schemes. This shows up in overt
concern for the well-being of fish stocks (positive response # 1
and negative response #1); the fact that many young men
favored limited entry even though they are fully aware that the
benefits will show up far in the future if at all; and in the
questions fishermen have about the government's being able
to positively affect fish stocks through legislation. A concern
with the long-term situation is also revealed in the concern that
limited entry regulations might be subtly rigged so that, some-
time in the far future, the fisheries would "belong" to big
corporations. These respondents were clearly not merely
thinking of just making money at the expense of the fish stocks
in the next month or next year.
Second, an overwhelming number of the fishermen inter-
viewed were not just interested in limited entry as it affected
their industry, but in any increase in governmental regulation.
When we asked about limited entry legislation, we expected
pointed and specific commentary on fisheries management.
All too often, we received long treatises revealing a deep-
seated concern with trends in the Federal Government. Sev-
eral respondents specifically mentioned Watergate and
Koreagate. They were bothered by what they saw as Federal
waste, the self-serving bureaucracy, and what recently has
been termed as "Corporate Welfare." There were bothered
by the so-called lack of leadership and the inability of politi-
cians to propose creative solutions to pressing problems. They
also are people who want to control their own lives, make their
own decisions, and do something they consider useful in their
own way.
Our experiences left us with the strong impression that the
political support that limited entry legislation will receive (at
least in Maine and New Hampshire) is currently tied up with
attitudes and situations that go far beyond fish. ) 
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